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An alternative approach to measuring effectiveness in counterterrorism 
ABSTRACT 
This paper will review the ways in which the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and 
policies has been assessed and argue that they suffer largely from the same difficulties. For 
many of the chosen indicators it is not clear whether they represent what they are supposed to 
represent and whether shifts in the scores can be attributed to counterterrorism. After having 
discussed  these  problems,  a  different  way  of  measuring  counterterrorism  effectiveness  is 
outlined. It rests on the assumption that counterterrorism should be broken down into separate 
components that should all be evaluated separately. For all components, a causal chain from 
cause (measure) to effect (shift in indicator) should be formulated to solve the meaning and 
attribution problems. 
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Introduction 
Over  the  last  couple  of  years,  states  have  spent  vast  amounts  of  resources  on  the 
development  and  implementation  of  counterterrorism  measures,  ranging  from  security 
measures to the adoption of special legislation and from media campaigns to CBRN-proof 
equipment for first responders. However, the question where it got us, is still left unanswered. 
The problem is not that the state’s counterterrorism efforts went unnoticed: there has been 
plenty of debate on especially the legal and ethical side of the matter. However, there is still no 
framework to assess whether the newly-introduced counterterrorism measures have yielded 
the  desired  results.  This  paper  will  therefore  address  the  question  of  how  effectiveness  in 
counterterrorism should be measured. It will in the first section review some ways in which the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies has been measured in counterterrorism research 
so far and will then wrap up this section by formulating the general difficulties that research 
into  the  effectiveness  of  counterterrorism  measures  suffers  from.
1  The  second  section  will 
introduce an alternative approach. Rather than identifying metric measures of success for a 
counterterrorism  policy  as  a  whole  and  looking  for  combinations  of  measures  whose 
introduction  is  followed  by  desirable  scores,  e.g.  lower  numbers  of  terrorist  attacks,  this 
approach argues in favour of  breaking up success in counterterrorism into several ‘success 
factors’. Briefly, success factors are activities for which it can be argued that they are helpful in 
the fight against terrorism and together constitute success in counterterrorism. Examples of 
success factors include restraint (the state should be very careful not to lash out and further 
antagonise the population), coordination (all players involved in counterterrorism should take 
into  account  the  activities  all  other  players  when  executing  their  own)  and  international 
cooperation (as planning or preparation of terrorist attacks may take place abroad, the relevant 
foreign countries need to be involved in the fight against terrorism). Using the example of a 
social reintegration program for convicted terrorists, it will be argued in the remainder of the 
second section that for all these success factors separately, it should be made explicit along 
which  causal  chain  they  are  supposed  to  lead  to  success  and  how  success  should  be 
measured. 
                                                 
1 Perhaps surprisingly, there is little research that examines the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. See C. Lum, L. W. 
Kennedy, and A. Sherley, “Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell Systematic Review on counter-
terrorism evaluation research,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 2, no. 4 (2006): 489-516. 2 
 
1. Measures of effectiveness 
1.1 Direct consequences of terrorist attacks 
When  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  counterterrorism  strategies,  it  is  tempting  to  look  at 
statistics that can be derived from terrorist attacks. First, they provide hard data. This has the 
advantage that increases and decreases can be clearly established. Also, the numbers can be 
counted, compared and visualised in bar charts, which makes them seem like appealing and 
feasible indicators of success. Also, they seem to go to the heart of what terrorism is about. As 
the ultimate ambition of all counterterrorism practitioners is an end to terrorist attacks and 
casualties as a result of terrorist attacks, it makes intuitive sense to look at indicators like the 
numbers of terrorist attacks and the numbers of victims. However, there are severe drawbacks 
to this way of working. This section will discuss some measurements of effectiveness that used 
statistics derived from terrorist attacks. 
1.1.1 Numbers of terrorist attacks 
A  widely-used  indicator  of  success  is  the  number  of  terrorist  attacks.  For  example,  Gary 
LaFree examined the effect of some interventions by the British state in Northern Ireland by 
looking  at  the  numbers  of  terrorist  attacks  that  took  place  after  the  measures  had  been 
implemented.
2 Similarly, Pestana Barros tried to establish the effects of the opening up by the 
Spanish state of political channels for the ETA. He does so by comparing the numbers of 
attacks in periods in which the more conciliatory PP was in power to those in periods in which 
the more intransigent PSOE was in power.
3 A third example is Hillel Frisch, who shows that the 
intensity of Palestinian violence decreases in periods when Israel uses massive force and offers 
no concessions.
4 
Although terrorists need a certain level of violence to maintain their credibility, there are good 
reasons to be critical of the use of numbers of terrorist attacks as indicators of success of 
counterterrorism measures. First, it is not clear what increases and decreases say about the 
                                                 
2  G.  LaFree,  Efficacy  of  counterterrorism  approaches:  examining  Northern  Ireland,  START  Research  Brief,  2006, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/20061017_lafree.pdf.  
3 C.P. Barros, “An intervention analysis of terrorism: the Spanish ETA case,” Defence and Peace Economics 14, no. 6 (2003): 401-
412. 
4 H. Frisch, “Motivation or capabilities? Israeli counterterrorism against Palestinian suicide bombings and violence,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 866-867. 3 
 
state of the terrorist organisation committing the attacks. It is possible that a group in decline 
initiates a wave of terrorist attacks to send a message, both to its own members and to the 
population at large, that it is not finished yet. In this case, an increase in the numbers of attacks 
is certainly not a sign that a counterterrorism strategy is not working. An increase can also be 
the result of radicalisation of a movement in leadership transition, when the new leaders are 
vesting their authority by organising spectacular or large numbers of attacks.  
A second problem with using numbers of attacks as indicators of success or effectiveness is 
that they do not say much about the impact of a terrorist campaign. Not all terrorist attacks are 
similar, and one would expect the impact of a large-scale attack, like 9/11, one that requires 
much preparation, resources and operational capabilities, to be bigger than the impact of a 
simple arson. Going purely by numbers of attacks means that these differences will be ignored. 
This can be especially confusing if terrorist organisations decide to lower the frequency of their 
attacks to save resources for bigger, more advanced attacks.
5 To complicate matters further, 
the  numbers  of  terrorist  attacks  do  not  necessarily  correlate  with  impact  favourable  for  a 
terrorist organisation. Research has shown that the psychological impact of the IRA bombings 
was limited in parts of the United Kingdom that were often struck.
6 Also, bombing campaigns 
can turn against the terrorists. There are already signs that al Qaeda is losing popular support 
in the Middle East because of the bloody attacks it commits.
7 An increase in the number of 
terrorist attacks may be harmful to the cause of the terrorist organisation.  
Finally, as the impact of a single attack can be huge, terrorist organisations do not need to 
commit as many attacks as possible. The assassination of a head of government of a cabinet 
member is a single attack, yet sends a very powerful message about a terrorist organisation’s 
ability  to  disrupt  a  country’s  political  process.  A  few  small  attacks  can  yield  a  terrorist 
organisation much more success than a series of bigger ones. 
                                                 
5 D. Byman, “Scoring the war on terror,” The National Interest 72 (2003): 81. 
6 A. Silke, “The psychological impact of terrorism: lessons from the UK experience,” in Meeting the challenges of global terrorism: 
prevention, control, and recovery (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), 189-202. 
7  P.  Bergen  and  P.  Cruickshank,  “The  unraveling:  the  jihadist  revolt  against  Bin  Laden,”  The  New  Republic,  2008, 
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=702bf6d5-a37a-4e3e-a491-fd72bf6a9da1; “Al-Qaeda: the cracks begin to show,” Times 
Online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4087373.ece. 4 
 
A well-known body of research that examines the effects of counterterrorism on the basis of 
numbers of attacks, concerns target hardening measures to prevent airplane hijackings.
8 This 
research shows that target hardening measures do indeed reduce the numbers of attacks on 
the newly hardened targets. However, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler themselves provide 
insights that would keep one from interpreting these measures too easily as successful. Again 
using  numbers  of  terrorist  incidents,  they  have  demonstrated  the  substitution  effect:  the 
hardening of one kind of target leads to increases in the numbers of attacks on other targets.
9 
These  findings  suggest  that  defensive  measures  have  a  way  of  moving  the  problem 
somewhere else rather than solving it. 
It is clear that the use of numbers of terrorist attacks as indicators of success comes with 
severe difficulties. Some of these may be fixed by looking at numbers of casualties. 
1.1.2 Numbers of victims 
A way around the argument that terrorist attacks are no equal units like dollars or inches, could 
be the inclusion of the number of casualties in the analysis. Yonah Alexander, editor of two 
volumes  of  comparative  counterterrorism  studies,  and  Nadav  Morag  included  numbers  of 
casualties as a criterion that counterterrorist campaigns should be judged by.
10 
Many of the arguments that can be made against using numbers of terrorist attacks can also 
be  made  against  the  use  of  numbers  of  casualties.  Increases  can  be  the  result  from 
radicalisation brought about by declining power or the eagerness of new leaders, populations 
can  learn to  accept victims of  terrorist attacks as  a  fact  of  life  and  can  even turn  against 
terrorists for causing too many casualties. Regarding this latter point, it is interesting to note 
that  some  terrorist  attacks,  especially  when  there  are  children  among  the  victims,  can  be 
operational successes but political disasters for terrorist organisations. The population will be 
outraged over the deaths over innocent victims and withdraw their support to the terrorists. An 
                                                 
8 W. M. Landes, “An economic study of US aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976,” Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 1-31; J. 
Cauley and E. I. Im, “Intervention policy analysis of skyjackings and other terrorist incidents,” The American Economic Review 78, 
no.  2  (1988):  27-31;  W.  Enders,  T.  Sandier,  and  J.  Cauley,  “UN  conventions,  technology  and  retaliation  in  the  fight  against 
terrorism: An econometric evaluation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2, no. 1 (1990): 83-105. 
9 W. Enders and T. Sandier, “The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: a vector-autoregression-intervention analysis,” American 
Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (1993): 829-844. 
10 Y. Alexander, “Introduction,” in Combating terrorism: strategies of ten countries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 
1-23; N. Morag, “Measuring success in coping with terrorism: the Israeli case,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 
210-211. 5 
 
argument  that  can  be  made  specifically  against  the  use  of  numbers  of  victims  is  that  an 
increase in the number of casualties can be the result of a substitution effect from hardened to 
softer  targets.  If  a  terrorist  organisation  finds  itself  unable  to  strike  at  hard  targets,  it  may 
choose to direct its attacks at targets that are easier to hit.
11 Schools and market squares may 
then  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  terrorist  attacks,  which  will  lead  to  higher  numbers  of 
casualties  but  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  that  the  terrorist  organisation  is  getting 
stronger. In this case, an increase in the numbers of victims can even be read as a sign of 
weakness of the terrorist organisation. Like numbers of attacks, numbers of victims have by 
themselves no unambiguous meaning. 
1.1.3 Material damage 
A final metric indicator of success in counterterrorism, although not one that is used very often, 
is material damage.
12 This indicator suffers from largely the same problems as the previous 
two. It is not necessary to repeat the arguments from the previous paragraphs, so let it suffice 
to say that more material damage can make the population turn against the terrorists, can be 
the result of radicalization processes that are not related to any counterterrorism measures and 
can reflect a shift to easier targets on the part of the terrorist organization. 
1.2 Indirect indicators 
Instead of focusing on data about the direct manifestations of terrorism, some authors have 
looked at indirect indicators, i.e. fluctuations in indicators of the general functioning of a society 
that are thought to be influenced by terrorist attacks. For example, it has been argued that 
domestic and international support for the government executing the counterterrorism policy 
could  serve  as  an  indicator  of  the  success  of  that  policy.  Although  the  support  of  the 
population is crucial for the success of a counterterrorism strategy, using it as an indicator of 
success  is  difficult,  as  it  may  result  from  other  policies  than  a  counterterrorism  policy. 
Regarding  domestic  support, it may  even be the  case  that  a  generous  welfare  policy may 
provide the government with the support needed to implement a counterterrorism policy that 
would  otherwise  not  have  been  accepted.  International  support  may well  be  generated  by 
                                                 
11 M. A. Sheehan, Crush the cell: how to defeat terror without terrorizing ourselves (New York: The Crown Publishing Group, 2007), 
28-29 and L.E. Dutter and O. Seliktar, “To martyr or not to martyr: jihad is the question, what policy is the answer?”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 30 (2007): 440. 
12 Alexander, “Introduction.” 6 
 
skilful  diplomacy  rather  than  by  the  counterterrorism  policy  itself.  This  is  certainly  not  to 
question the importance of domestic and international support in counterterrorism. Quite the 
contrary, it is a sine qua non of success in both terrorism and counterterrorism, but it depends 
on so many other factors that it does not necessarily tell us much about the counterterrorism 
policy that was implemented. For example, a terrorist attack may convince a population about 
the need of certain controversial counterterrorism measures. Using support for the government 
as an indicator of effectiveness would give the impression that the counterterrorism policy was 
less effective on the day before the attack than on the day after, which is not a conclusion that 
most of us would be willing to accept. 
Another option is to establish the effectiveness of a counterterrorism policy by looking at the 
functioning of the economy. This has been done by looking at the growth of the GDP and the 
fluctuations of the stock market.
13 The assumption is here that, when the economy is thriving, 
the  terrorists  have  not  managed  to  severely  disrupt  the  functioning  of  the  country.  The 
difficulties are obvious. First, fluctuations in the economy can be the result of many factors, 
most of which have nothing to with terrorism. Second, and this partly follows from the first 
point, terrorist attacks tend to have little impact on the economy.
14 Even the 9/11 attacks, 
which took place at the heart of the American economy, were too small and too localized to 
have serious consequences for an economy as vast and diversified as the American.
15 The 
limited effect on the economy of these attacks, which have had vast effects in other spheres, 
begs the question whether the economy is sensitive to terrorist attacks at all and suggests that 
the economy is not the right place to look for the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. 
1.3. Government action 
1.3.1 Numbers of arrests 
This indicator is best known for its use by the US Government, which, for example, claimed in 
2006 that the arrests of high level al Qaeda cadres showed that the US was making progress in 
the fight against terrorism. The capture of al Qaeda cadres, especially in Afghanistan in the 
                                                 
13 Morag, “Measuring success in coping with terrorism: the Israeli case”; A. Zussman and N. Zussman, “Assassinations: evaluating 
the effectiveness of an Israeli counterterrorism policy using stock market data,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 2 (2006): 
193-206. 
14 T. Sandler, D. G. Arce, and W. Enders, Terrorism: Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Consensus Center, 2008), 18-19. 
15 G. Makinen, The economic effects of 9/11: a retrospective assessment, Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 
2002), 18-19. 7 
 
wake of the overthrow of the Taliban, was hailed as a step towards paralysing the al Qaeda 
network.
16 Of course, the arrest of any criminal is to some extent always a success for a state, 
as it is a way of asserting its ability to enforce its rules. Having said that, one should be careful 
not to read too much into it.  
For one thing, at least in the case of al Qaeda, terrorists can easily be replaced. It has long 
been recognised that when al Qaeda cadres are arrested, or eliminated for that matter, new 
recruits are eager to take their places.
17 The more popular the movement, the bigger the pool 
of possible successors to arrested terrorists. Second, arrests, especially in large numbers, may 
have consequences that do certainly do not qualify as success for the state. In some cases, 
the  arrests  themselves  may  draw  people  who  were  previously  only  sympathisers  into  the 
terrorist  organisation.  Infuriation  over  the  treatment  of  friends  and  relatives  by  the  state, 
including  waves  of  arrests,  has  proven  to  be  a  powerful  motive  for  joining  a  terrorist 
organisation, for example in the case of the IRA.
18 Another way in which arrests can indirectly 
and  inadvertently  exacerbate  the  situation  concerns  the  power  vacuum  that  results  from 
arrests of leading cadres. The new leaders may want to underline the credibility of their claims 
to dominance by advocating spectacular actions, which can thus lead to radicalisation of the 
organisation.  The  third difficulty  in  using  numbers  of  arrests  is  that  they  may  very  well  be 
indicators  of  things  other  than  success.  For  example,  it  may  tell  us  more  about  the 
performance of the police forces making the arrests. The numbers of arrests may have gone up 
as a result of a re-orientation on the part of the police, which may have decided to put more 
pressure on the terrorists. Although an increase in the numbers of arrests can then be a goal in 
itself, it does not mean that that a policy has been successful. Another possibility is that the 
number of arrests has gone up as a result of an increase in terrorist activity. Assuming that the 
same percentage of active terrorists will under similar circumstances get arrested, an increase 
in the numbers of arrests may indicate a reinvigoration of a terrorist campaign. This is not to 
say that changes in the numbers of arrests should be interpreted along these lines, but that 
they in themselves provide no basis to draw conclusions about success or effectiveness.  
                                                 
16 US Government, “9/11 five years later: successes and challenges,” 2006, 4 and 7. 
17  B.M.  Jenkins,  Countering  al  Qaeda:  an  appreciation  of  the  situation  and  suggestions  for  strategy  (Santa  Monica:  RAND 
Corporation, 2002), 10. 
18 W. E. Cralley, A. J. Garfield, and C. Echeverria, Understanding terrorism: lessons of the past - indicators for the future, IDA Paper 
(Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), III-5; B. Riedel, The search for al Qaeda: its leadership, ideology, and future 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 16. 8 
 
The only situation in which numbers of arrests could be used as an indicator of success is a 
campaign against a declining organisation with a known size and little to no outside support. 
Only  then,  when  one  can  be  certain  that  arrested  members  will  not  be  replaced  and  that 
arrests will not generate support for the terrorists, can making arrests be seen as chipping 
away at the organisation. 
1.4 General difficulties with measures of effectiveness 
Drawing  on  the  objections  that  can  be  made  against  the  abovementioned  indicators  of 
success, we can now identify three major factors that affect the feasibility of the indicators of 
success that have been used so far in counterterrorism research. This section will also discuss 
substitution  effects,  which  throw  doubt  on  the  feasibility  of  the  measures  of  success,  not 
because they question the validity of the measures of effectiveness, but because they suggest 
that counterterrorism success may cause problems elsewhere.  
1.4.1 Difficulties with the meaning of indicators 
First, the problem with many of the indicators discussed above is that it is not clear whether 
they  can  be  interpreted  as  a  success.  There  are  a  lot  of  possible  causes  for  increases  in 
numbers  of  terrorist  attacks,  as  there  are  a  lot  of  reasons  why  the  numbers  of  arrested 
terrorists might go up. Before we know more about the drivers behind the dynamics in these 
indicators, using them as indicators of success is not a viable option. 
Second, even if it is clear that a change in the indicators can be interpreted as a success, there 
is  still  the  attribution  problem.  We  have  seen  above  that  it  is  not  clear  for  all  indicators, 
especially the ones referring to the economy, that changes are driven by counterterrorism. A 
factor that further complicates matters, is that there are often quite a few counterterrorism 
measures in place at the same time. Even if an appropriate measure of effectiveness would be 
found,  it  would  still  be  unclear  which  instrument  or  measure  or  which  combination  of 
instruments or measures had brought about the desired effect. Also, it may well be that the 
beneficial effects of one instrument are drowned out by the negative effects of others. The 
interpretation problem and the attribution problem are strongly related: gaining clarity about 
what caused a change in an indicator (solving the attribution problem) will also shed light on 
whether that change is desirable or not (solving the problems with the interpretation). 9 
 
The third general difficulty with the interpretation of indicators of counterterrorism success is 
the problem of the difference between operational and strategic success. This argument is 
especially pressing for the indicators that draw on terrorist attacks. A mistake often made, by 
scholars and practitioners alike, is to apply the logic of regular warfare to counterterrorism.
19 
The use of numbers of arrests, victims or attacks to measure success or effectiveness rests on 
the assumption that the outcome of the confrontation is decided by operational capabilities. If 
a terrorist organization is becoming more active or more violent, it is closer to defeating the 
state and thus to gaining success. In the same vein, if the state breaks up a terrorist cell and 
thus reduces the operational capabilities of the terrorist organization, the state is perceived to 
be winning. This line of reasoning mistakenly applies the logic of state-to-state – warfare to a 
conflict between a state and a terrorist organization. In the former case, where the goal on both 
sides is to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, it is perfectly legitimate to identify operational 
success (e.g. winning a battle) with strategic success (decisively defeating the enemy). The 
problem is that the confrontation between a state and a terrorist organisation is a political, not 
a military confrontation. A certain degree of operational success does not necessarily imply a 
similar  degree  of  political  success.
20  For  example,  we  have  seen  that  terrorist  attacks  can 
backfire against terrorist organizations, especially when there are children among the victims. 
Another demonstration of the oblique relationship between operational and strategic success 
in terrorism and counterterrorism is the argument made by Brian Michael Jenkins, who claims 
that al Qaeda does not necessarily need nuclear capabilities to be a nuclear power. It instils 
fear for nuclear terrorist attacks without ever having displayed the capabilities to acquire and 
employ nuclear weapons.
21 This means that in terrorism, political or strategic success can be 
achieved in the absence of operational success, an observation that goes to underscore the 
main point that should be made here: operational success does not automatically translate into 
political success,  and  politics is what  ultimately decides  the  outcome  of the  confrontation. 
There are several ways in which terrorists can try to get their way. For example, terrorists can 
commit terrorist attacks to raise the costs of the continuation of certain government policies, 
they can undermine confidence in the state by showing that its violence against the population 
at large can go unpunished and they can commit their attacks to provoke a violent reaction 
from  the  state  that  will  make  the  population  against  the  state.
22  None  of  these  strategies 
                                                 
19 See for example A. Bolivàr, “Peru,” in Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2002), 95. 
20 E. F. Mickolus, “Comment--Terrorists, governments, and numbers: counting things versus things that count,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 31, no. 1 (1987): 55-56. 
21 B.M. Jenkins, Will terrorists go nuclear? (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008), 241-276. 
22 A. H. Kydd and B. F. Walter, “The strategies of terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49-80. 10 
 
suggest a necessary relation between operational and political success. Terrorism is a way of 
sending a message, and its success therefore depends on the way that message is perceived. 
Will the government feel forced to cut its losses and cease following a certain policy? Will the 
population lose confidence in the state as a result of a series of terrorist attacks? Will the state 
indeed react violently to retaliate for terrorist attacks? Terrorists can only try to influence minds, 
they do not control them. The reaction to a certain level or kind of terrorist violence is not 
always easy to predict as it does not automatically follow from the terrorist violence alone. 
Instead  of  wavering  in  the  face  of  terrorist  violence,  a  government  may  become  more 
determined to stay put. Instead of losing confidence in the state, civilians may rally around it 
because  they  see  it  as  their  only  option  for  protection  against  terrorist  attacks.  Instead  of 
lashing out in reaction to terrorist attacks, governments may hold back to avoid coming across 
as the repressive monster the terrorists make it out to be. Although data derived from terrorist 
violence can be very useful for analyses regarding changes in the modus operandi of terrorist 
organisations, there are too many caveats regarding their usefulness as indicators of success 
to use them to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies.  
1.4.2 Substitution effects 
Two other difficulties that should be raised, concern the viability of the idea of success in 
counterterrorism in the first place, regardless of the way in which it is being measured. Even 
assuming  that  one  of  the  indicators  above  would  help  to  identify  successes  in 
counterterrorism, this notion of success itself might be too narrow. Success in one place may 
lead to setbacks in other places and success against one form of violence may lead to an 
increase in others. 
First, there is the geographical substitution effect. Measuring or describing the effectiveness of 
a counterterrorism policy or a counterterrorism measure often happens on a state by state 
basis. Counterterrorism policies are national policies, or at least policies that are implemented 
by a government with control over a certain territory. Consequently, the effects of that policy 
are understood as effects that manifest themselves on that particular territory. This way of 
working ignores the geographical substitution effect. Eradication of a terrorist movement in one 
country may divert the people and the resources to movements in other countries. A clear 
example, although some may argue that it does not concern a terrorist organization, is the 
spread  of  Stop  Huntingdon  Animal  Cruelty  (SHAC)  over  Europe.  In  2004,  the  British 11 
 
government adopted a set of measures that made it impossible for SHAC, an extremist animal 
rights movement, to function in the UK. In the years since, the members of SHAC have spread 
over Europe and have contributed to the radicalization of the European extremist animal rights 
movement.
23 The success of the British legislation against animal rights extremism thus came 
at the expense of more animal rights extremism elsewhere in Europe. Similarly, experts have 
noticed that ever since it has become clear that al Qaeda jihadists were losing ground in Iraq, 
the  focus  of  jihadist  activity  has  shifted  to  Afghanistan.
24  Second,  there  is  the  functional 
substitution effect, which means that terrorism does not really disappear, but rather turns into 
different forms of aggression. A narrow view of success in counterterrorism, for example in 
cases  where  the  effectiveness  of  counterterrorism  policies  is  measured  on  the  basis  of 
statistics on terrorist attacks, pays no heed to the possibility that the substitution effect in 
counterterrorism can also manifest itself as a shift from terrorism to other ways of expressing 
discontent, for example vandalism.
25 These two substitution effects go to show that what is 
perceived as success in counterterrorism can also be a mere change or displacement of the 
problem. It is interesting to note that terrorism itself can in some cases be perceived as a 
functional  substitution  effect  of  other  forms  of  political  violence.  For  example,  Palestinian 
resistance resorted to terrorism after the Six Day War because it lacked the resources and 
room  for  manoeuvre  to  continue  its  guerrilla  campaign.
26  Thus,  what  goes  for  the 
disappearance of terrorism also goes for the disappearance of other forms of political violence: 
a focus only on that problem may lead to misinterpretations of measures of success.  
2. Success factors in counterterrorism 
The  discussion  above  is  meant  to  make  clear  that  the  ways  in  which  the  success  of 
counterterrorism  has  been  measured  so  far  are  fraught  with  difficulties  that  undermine the 
credibility of exercises that rely on one of the indicators of success mentioned above. The 
remainder  of  this  contribution  will  argue  a  different  approach.  The  core  idea  behind  this 
alternative approach to measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism is that success should 
be broken down in separate components, each with their own indicators of success. Instead of 
                                                 
23 AIVD, Animal rights activism in the Netherlands: springboard for Europe (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2007), 
12-13. 
24  “Afghanistan's  'pristine  jihad'  draws  in  outsiders  trained  in  Pakistan,”  Times  Online,  2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4368820.ece. 
25 A.R. Brotóns and C. Espósito, “Spain,” in Combating terrorism: strategies of ten countries (Ann Arbor, 2002), 176-177. 
26 B. O'Neil, “Towards a typology of political terrorism: the Palestinian resistance movement,” Journal of International Affairs 32, no. 
1 (1978): 31 and 42. 12 
 
relying on indicators that represent the effectiveness of a counterterrorism policy as a whole, 
one should first think of what elements constitute a success in counterterrorism policy. For all 
these success factors, about which more will be said below, it needs to be explicitly formulated 
along which causal chain they lead to effectiveness. 
The problem with the indicators discussed above is not that they are per se useless, but that it 
is  not  made  clear  how  they  constitute  effectiveness.  An  explanation  of  the  causal  chain 
between cause (a  counterterrorism measure) and effect (shifts in the scores of indicators / 
effectiveness) would help justify the choice for a certain indicator of effectiveness. However, 
such a program theory is difficult to formulate when the indicator is supposed to say something 
about  something  as  multifaceted  as  a  counterterrorism  policy  in  its  entirety.  To  credibly 
attribute  shifts  in  the  scores  of  indicators  to  counterterrorism  measures,  counterterrorism 
needs  to  be  broken  down  in  separate  components,  each  with  their  own  indicators  of 
effectiveness. Breaking down counterterrorism in its separate components, it is easier to tell 
through which causal chain a measure or an element of a policy is supposed to lead to a 
desired  result.  After  that  measure  has  been  introduced,  the  evaluation  of  its  effectiveness 
would amount to examining whether the causal chain has played out in reality. An example 
may clarify this. 
One  could  imagine  that  a  social  reintegration  program  for  convicted  terrorists  has  as  its 
ultimate goal the undermining of the morale of a terrorist organisation, as a result of which it 
will  fall  apart.  A  successful  social  reintegration  program  would  offer  people  in  terrorist 
organisations an opportunity to leave, thus sowing mistrust within the organisation, where the 
members would start to question the loyalty of other members. Since it is unlikely that a social 
reintegration  program  by  itself  would  achieve  this  result,  one  might  add  an  efficient  law 
enforcement  apparatus,  which  heightens  the  risk  of  capture  and  diminishes  the  chance  of 
success, as a precondition for the social reintegration program to be successful. When the 
pressure of law enforcement agencies is high, members of the terrorist organisation may be 
more susceptible to alternatives to membership of the terrorist organisation. The causal chain 
then becomes: 13 
 
 
Figure 1: a program theory about social reintegration programs 
A state implementing a social reintegration program for convicted terrorists could reason that 
the  combination  of  pressure  and  more  attractive  alternatives  to  terrorism  will  make  the 
reintegration program a success: it succeeds in releasing convicted terrorists back into society 
without them falling back into the terrorist organisation. Once the program has been running for 
some  time,  the  secret  services  would  have  to  provide  the  intelligence  to  tell  whether  the 
reasoning held in practice. Is the morale of the organisation being undermined by the program? 
Are the members of the terrorist organisation indeed eager to leave? Is the mutual mistrust 
growing? These are all questions that provide input for the formulation of indicators of success. 
In this particular case, one could think of using the number of splits or decreasing intensity of 
contact between members of the organisation as indicators of success. The line of reasoning 
used in this example is very simple, but goes well to illustrate how each separate component of 
a counterterrorism policy could be evaluated separately to avoid some of the pitfalls discussed 
in  the  previous  section.  By  carefully  monitoring  it  can  be  ascertained  whether  or  not  the 
program  theory,  the  assumption  about  how  a policy  is  supposed  to  lead  to  effectiveness, 
actually holds. The attribution problem and the problem of the meaning of indicators are then 
partially solved: we have not only a correlation between the introduction of a policy and a shift 
in an indicator, but can also show how the two hang together. 14 
 
Going  over  the  counterterrorism  literature,  it  is  certainly  possible  to  find  elements  that  a 
counterterrorism  policy  should  contain.  Drawing  on  that  literature,  the  following  success 
factors, activities for which it can be argued that they are helpful in the fight against terrorism, 
can be identified: 
Restraint in the use of force. States should be careful not to antagonise the population by the 
excessive  used  of  force.  It  may  lead  to  escalation  of  violence  and  may  gain  the  terrorist 
organisation support.
27 
International cooperation. As many terrorist attacks are planned of financed in other countries 
than  where  they  are  executed,  states  need  the  help  of  other  states  to  deny  terrorist 
organisations the resources and space to plan their attacks.
28 
Coordination  and  strategy.  To  avoid  interagency  infighting  and  insufficient  intelligence 
dissemination,  all  players  involved  in  counterterrorism  should  be  committed  to  a  common 
strategy,  he  implementation  of  which  is  overseen  by  a  coordinator  with  the  power  and 
responsibilities to lead.
29 
Offering non-violent options. To draw organisations away from terrorism, the state should, by 
negotiation or the opening up of regular, non-violent political channels, make clear that non-
violent ways of achieving political goals have more chance of success.
30 
Gathering  intelligence.  It  is  crucial  that  the  state  acquires  the  intelligence  to  predict  the 
terrorists’  next  move,  foil  their  plots  and,  as  we  have  seen,  monitor  the  effect  of 
countermeasures.
31 
                                                 
27 A. K. Cronin, “Rethinking sovereignty: American strategy in the age of terrorism,” Survival 44, no. 2 (2002): 127; A. Faruqui, “Is 
the USA fighting terrorism with the wrong weapons?,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (2003): 122; N. Dower, “Against war as a 
response to terrorism,” Philosophy & Geography 5, no. 1 (2002): 29-30; M. Howard, “What's in a name? How to fight terrorism,” 
Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 10-11. 
28 See for example P. R. Pillar, “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 106-107; C. J. 
Oudraat, “Combating terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 163-164. 
29 See for example P. R. Pillar, “Intelligence,” in Attacking terrorism: elements of a grand strategy , 2004, 117-121; B. Hoffman and 
J. Morrison-Taw, A strategic framework for countering terrorism and insurgency (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), 6-30 
30 See for example J. L. Windsor, “Promoting democratization can combat terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2003): 
47-48. 
31 B. Ganor, The counter-terrorism puzzle: a guide for decision makers (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 47. 15 
 
Perform  basic  state  tasks.  Terrorism  is  a  way  of  undermining  state  authority,  so  it  is  very 
important that the state remains in control, especially when it comes to providing security to its 
citizens. An efficient law enforcement mechanism that manages to capture and try perpetrators 
of terrorist attacks goes a long way in showing the futility of terrorism.
32 
Address  root  causes.  To  win  the  support  of  the  terrorists’  constituency,  the  state  should 
eliminate the grievances that bring people to support terrorism. This could concern cultural or 
social discrimination, economic inequality and more specific political demands, such as ending 
an occupation. 
Long-term  commitment.  History  has  shown  that,  as  terrorist  campaigns  progress,  the 
population can grow weary of terrorist violence and will withdraw their support to the terrorists, 
which happened for example in Northern Ireland, Spain and India.
33 This means that the state 
has to be willing to commit itself to a position vis-à-vis the terrorist organisation for the long 
haul. 
Counter-narrative. To undermine the ideological support of the terrorist organisation, the state 
must  have  a  message  to  persuade  the  terrorists’  constituency  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the 
terrorists themselves of its benevolence and dispel the accusations about repression.
34 
Offer alternatives to membership of terrorist organisations. This is the example we used earlier. 
States should make sure that members of terrorist organisations have the opportunity to step 
out  of  the  terrorist  organisation.  Leaving  the  terrorist  organisation  should  be  made  more 
attractive, for example by providing the means for a definitive return into society.  
For all these success factors, separate evaluations should be set up. They are formulated on 
the strategic level, but it should be possible to specify what they success they should achieve, 
how that success should be measured, along which causal chain that success will come about 
                                                 
32  See  for  example  William  C.  Banks,  Mitchel  B.  Wallerstein,  and  Renée  de  Nevers,  Combating  terrorism:  strategies  and 
approaches (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 140-141. 
33  M.  Crenshaw,  “Thoughts  on  relating  terrorism  to  historical  contexts,”  in  Terrorism  in  context  (Pennsylvania:  University  of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 18-19. 
34 See for example D. Omand, “Countering international terrorism: the use of strategy,” Survival 47, no. 4 (2005): 109-110. 16 
 
and what instruments are supposed to bring it about. Figure 2 shows these steps, with the 
concrete example of the social reintegration program for illustration. 
 
Figure 2: elements of the evaluation of success factors 
Conclusion 
This paper has tried to offer a solution for the problems that come with attempts to measure 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism. We should give up attempts to find indicators that tell us 
something about the effectiveness of a counterterrorism policy as a whole. Instead, we should 
start out from the assumption that counterterrorism is made up of many different elements, all 
with  their  own  indicators  of  success.  The  success  factors  formulated  above  serve  as  an 
example  of  how  counterterrorism  could  be  broken  down.  But  whichever  way  to  break 
counterterrorism down is chosen, this differentiated approach calls for separate evaluations. 
Not only does this have the advantage of showing where a counterterrorism policy is doing 
well and where it is not, evaluations of success factors are easier to execute than evaluations 
of entire counterterrorism policies, because fewer factors need to be taken into account. This 
makes  for  more  credible  cause  and  effect  relations  that  can  later  on  be  examined  for 
evaluation. Has the cause and effect chain played out the way we initially thought it would? It is 
possible that some of the indicators we have discussed above can be useful, but then only if it 17 
 
can be made clear that it is the desirable result of a specific element of a counterterrorism 
policy. 